The Hungarian Revolution is often analysed in a national context or from the angle of 
3 "Minutes of the Politburo Session of 18 May 1955", Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale (ANIC) ale României, Romanian Workers' Party Central Committee (RCP CC), C, 37/1955. 4 This term has been used by historiography. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1967: 442) used it en passant in his book on Eastern Europe, providing an analysis of Kremlinology. Csaba Békés (2009: 229) introduced this term in "New Cold War history" as a novel approach to the international relations of the Soviet Bloc, based on his extensive multiarchival resarch. Crump used it as an analytical concept to explain the multilateralisation of the Warsaw Pact in her book, The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered (2015) . two months after Khrushchev's speech (Crump 2015, 38 (Granville, 2004: 48) . Gomułka was an independent-minded former Stalinist victim, who had supported Tito after his break with the Soviet Union in 1948.
The Kremlin panicked, accordingly, and asked the Chinese for advice on a possible military intervention, presumably in order to placate them after the secret speech.
The Chinese leaders stressed that this was an internal affair, and advised Khrushchev against mobilising troops. Meanwhile, Gomułka managed both to convince Khrushchev of his loyalty to the Soviet bloc, and to keep the situation in Poland under control.
Khrushchev still invited a Chinese delegation to Moscow from 23 to 31 October to negotiate the "political solution" in Poland, possibly in order to withstand East German and Czechoslovak pressure "to restore order" in Poland (Kemp-Welch, 2008: 102) . The East German and Czechoslovak leaders, who were also invited to Moscow, considered unrest in Poland a considerable geopolitical risk, since its potential collapse could expose their countries to West German revanchism. All other WP members, apart from Albania, had also been invited. The Hungarian and Romanian leaders did not attend. They were far too busy at home, and visiting Belgrade, respectively.
Liberalisation and escalation (1956)
Khrushchev's secret speech had also created considerable unrest in Hungary, where the 
